A group signature is a basic privacy mechanism. The group joining operation is a critical component of such a scheme. To date all secure group signature schemes either employed a trustedparty aided join operation or a complex joining protocol requiring many interactions between the prospective user and the Group Manager (GM). In addition no efficient scheme employed a join protocol proven secure against adversaries that have the capability to dynamically initiate multiple concurrent join sessions during an attack.
Introduction
Group signatures is a useful anonymous non-repudiable multi-use credential primitive that was introduced by Chaum and Van Heyst [18] . It involves a group of users, each holding a membership certificate that allows a user to issue a publicly verifiable signature while hiding the identity of the actual signer within the group. The public-verification procedure employs only the public-key of the group. Furthermore, in the case of any dispute or abuse, it is possible for the group manager (GM) to "open" an individual signature and reveal the identity of its originator.
Constructing an efficient group signature has been a research target for many years, see e.g., [19, 17, 14, 15, 10, 29, 4, 2, 12, 26, 9, 3, 11, 13] . A scalable scheme that provides constant signature size and has resistance to attacks by coalitions of users was given in [2] . Earlier constructions were designed without a formal model and definition of security of such schemes, and thus with partial security proofs at the best case (while many were actually broken).
A central issue in group signatures has been the way by which users join the group. Recently, [6] gave the first formal model of a somewhat "relaxed" group signature primitive where a trusted party generates and hands out all users' keys. They also produced a generic solution thus demonstrating the polynomial-time plausibility of their notion of trusted-party aided join group signatures. This is in contrast with users who dynamically join the system and get their individual keys by interacting with the group manager (as in the protocol of [2] ). Dynamic joins that allow users to register sequentially were studied formally in [25, 27] where efficient constructions were given and in [6, 7] where a generic plausibility proof was provided.
The most efficient and conceptually simple joining procedure for a group signature scheme (what we will call the "single-message and signature-response paradigm") was illustrated by Camenisch and Stadler [17] who sketched a generic solution (which was followed in careful details in [6, 7] ). In this type of joining protocol, the prospective user has an appropriately distributed secret x and it computes a one way function f on it to obtain x = f (x ). The user sends x to the GM who, in turn, signs x and returns the signature σ to the user using an appropriate signing algorithm. This completes the interaction of the join protocol. The possession of the signature σ on x = f (x ) enables a user to sign anonymously a message m by simply encrypting x probabilistically into ψ (under the GM's public key or whatever entity is supposed to execute the opening algorithm) and by providing a zero-knowledge proof of (i) the fact that the ψ is an encryption of some x known to the prover, (ii) the fact that the prover knows x a preimage of that x under f , (iii) the fact that the prover knows a signature issued by the GM on that x.
While the Camenisch-Stadler approach is elegant and advantageous (as we argue below), its instantiation by an efficient scheme turned out to be elusive, since the many schemes that have been suggested in the last eight years approximated it but none really employed it. In fact, all the efficient schemes in the non-trusted-party-aided joining setting that were not broken used additional communications during the join protocol usually to assure that certain constraints and certain knowledge of the joining user is present, i.e., the prospective user had to engage in an interactive zero-knowledge proof with the GM. It was not at all apparent whether the single-message and signature-response join would actually be instantiable in an efficient manner in a provably secure scheme. Moreover the employment of such proofs of knowledge has the usual shortcomings with respect to adversaries operating in the concurrent setting (namely, rewinding cannot be employed and a "straight-line" approach needs to be followed that makes the joining protocols even more involved).
To conclude the motivation for our result, we summarize the advantages of a group signature employing a single-message and signature-response joining protocol:
time. This enables group managers over the Internet (where servers are multi-thread machines).
Proxy Join:
Users can be joined by a proxy collecting all their requests and then collecting the responses from the group manager; this is a very effective way to enroll companies and organizations by delegating collection and distribution to security officers. It is highly effective in enrolling to an identity escrow scheme without the need for random oracle proofs.
3. Multi-Group Scenario: There may be a number of groups; since single-message and signatureresponse joins require essentially no interaction between the GM and the prospective user, users may accumulate many GM membership signatures on the same x value non-interactively thus easily becoming members of multiple-groups.
Our result
In this work we implement the first group signature scheme with a single-message and signatureresponse join protocol to be exploited for concurrent joins and other advantages as above, thus implementing efficiently the Camenisch-Stadler approach for the first time 1 . We start by presenting the first model of "group signature with concurrent joins" which builds on the recent formal models and consists of a set of attacks. We note that in a privacy primitive interacting users may be conducting simultaneous attacks against each other and these need to be captured formally. We call our attacks: misidentification attack, framing attack and anonymity attack and is an extension of our sequential-join formal model for group signatures in [27] . We then implement a scheme based on specific assumptions and prove its security. The scheme allows adversarial opening of signatures and its signature size is only about twice the size of the scheme of [2] (that did not allow for adversarial opening or concurrent join attacks).
From a technical viewpoint we employ a number of complex primitives including the digital signature scheme of Boneh and Boyen [8] (hence referred to as the BB signature) as well as verifiable encryption for discrete-logarithms that are based on the Paillier encryption function [31, 21, 16, 24] .
A novelty of our technical approach (and perhaps a partial explanation why we manage to achieve an efficient single-message and signature-response join) is that we deviate from most of recent group signature literature by instantiating the one-way function employed by the prospective user during the join with multiplication instead of exponentiation. Our general design approach is outlined in figure  1 : users sample an RSA modulus and then obtain a short chain of BB certificates on it (numbering from one to five signatures). This modest interaction (which is simply a PKI registration in a domain employing RSA moduli with a BB signature for certification) allows users to sign as group members.
Our security proofs follow a modular approach: in a nutshell, a misidentification adversary is turned into a BB-forger, a framing adversary is turned into a factoring algorithm and an anonymity attacker is turned into a CCA2 adversary against the encryption algorithm we employ. The group signature itself is based on the Fiat-Shamir paradigm, by essentially turning an identity escrow (anonymous identification) system into a signature and employing a random oracle. We note that the interactive version of our group signature yields an identity escrow scheme in a straightforward manner that can also have concurrent group signing by employing general transformation techniques for Σ-protocols, e.g. [23] . The present manuscript is a full version containing proofs, minor corrections as well as a more flexible and efficient protocol construction compared to the proceedings version [28] .
Preliminaries
Interactive Turing Machines and Concurrent Executions. A two-party protocol is a pair of probabilistic polynomial-time bounded Interactive Turing machines A, B . Each of A, B has a private input tape, work-tapes, a (joint) communication tape and a private output tape. An execution of a protocol A, B on inputs x, y for the two players will be denoted by [A(x), B(y)]. For an execution of a protocol we will consider the following random variables: (i) Trans[A(x), B(y)] is the contents of the communication tape after the two parties terminate. (ii) Out A [A(x), B(y)] is the contents of the private output tape of player A after termination. (iii) Out B [A(x), B(y)] is the contents of the private output tape of player B after termination. Now suppose that P = A, B is a protocol. An "interface oracle" for concurrent simulation of player B, denoted by I[P ↔B(y) ], is an oracle that accepts the following queries:
The interface oracle I[P ↔B(y) ] initiates a session for the protocol P: it selects a session identifier s and if B is the player that goes first in the protocol P, the interface simulates the first move of B on input y; the interface returns as answer to the Start − Session query the session identifier s and the output of the simulation of player B's first move (if any , where READ St is an oracle interfaced to M through I that given a fixed input returns the contents of the St and similarly MODIFY St is an oracle that allows M to modify the contents of St using some standard encoding and addressing scheme.
Bilinear Maps. Let G 1 , G 2 two groups of prime order p so that (i) G 1 = g 1 and G 2 = g 2 ; (ii) τ : G 2 → G 1 is an isomorphism with τ (g 2 ) = g 1 and (iii) e : G 1 × G 2 → G T is a bilinear map. We remark that in many cases it can be that G 1 = G 2 (and in this case ψ would be the identity mapping). Let G 1 = g 1 , G 2 = g 2 groups as above with |G 1 | = |G 2 | = p; a bilinear map is a map e s.t. for all (u, v) ∈ G 1 × G 2 it holds that e(u x , v y ) = e(u, v) xy and e(g 1 , g 2 ) = 1.
Intractability Assumptions. We will employ the following intractability assumptions:
The Strong Diffie Hellman Assumption (SDH) was put forth by Boneh and Boyen [8] . The q-SDH problem over two groups G 1 , G 2 is defined as follows: given a (q + 2)-tuple
, x) where x ∈ Z * p . The q-SDH assumption suggests that any probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm solving the q-SDH problem has negligible success probability. When q is any polynomial-time function on the security parameter we will write simply SDH.
The Strong-RSA problem [5] is as follows: given n, z ∈ QR(n), where QR(n) is the group of quadratic residues of Z * n asks for two integers u, e > 1 so that u e ≡ n z. The Strong-RSA assumption suggests that any PPT algorithm solving the Strong-RSA problem has negligible success probability.
The Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) assumption [31] is defined as follows: it is computationally hard to distinguish between the distributions of tuples of the form (N, u N mod N 2 ) where N is an RSA safe composite modulus and u ← R Z * N 2 and the distribution of tuples of the form (N, v) where N is an RSA safe composite modulus and v ← R Z * N .
Group Signatures with Concurrent Join : Modeling
In this section we give the formal definition of group signatures with concurrent join. First we start with the syntax of the signature. The parties that are involved in the scheme include the Group Manager (GM), the Users and the Verifiers. 
Syntax
Similarly we will define cert Y sec, if there exist coin tosses ρ for J GM and J User and a state St so that 
Correctness
Below we define the correctness of a group signature scheme that satisfies the above syntax. Note that a group signature is a tuple SETUP, JOIN, SIGN, VERIFY, OPEN with JOIN = J User , J GM . Property C1 requires that the JOIN protocol assigns a different identity tag to all users. Property C2 ensures the correctness of the underlying signing and verification for any valid signing key (that includes a membership secret and a membership certificate). Finally, property C3 ensures that the OPEN algorithm correctly identifies all signers: in particular it says that if a user is introduced at some moment in the system's operation and the public-state St is updated with the user's identity tag resulting to state St then it holds that whenever this user issues a group signature the user will be correctly identified for every public state St that succeeds the public-state St of the system. We note that it may be viable to collapse C1 and C3 but, given the intuitiveness of the formulation, we keep them as separate properties.
Security
Security against group signatures with concurrent join, will be broken into three basic properties following the model designs of [25, 27] . The properties are formalized as games between the adversary and an entity called the interface, denoted by I that represents the uncorrupted aspect of the system in each attack.
Misidentification. In a misidentification attack, the adversary joins the system through possibly many concurrent sessions of the JOIN protocol and it attempts to produce a signature that cannot be opened to any of the users that are adversarially controlled. We note that without loss of generality we will assume that all users introduced in the system are adversarially controlled; this means that the goal of the adversary is to simply make the OPEN algorithm to fail. We remark that adversaries that make the OPEN algorithm to point to an innocent user will be handled in the framing attack (next paragraph).
Below, I St [JOIN ↔GM ] will denote the interface oracle for concurrent simulation of the GM party in the protocol JOIN (refer to section 2 for the definition). Note that the interface I has access to the public state string St and it updates it accordingly whenever a new user (the adversary that is) successfully completes the JOIN dialog. Also, an oracle READ St is provided to the adversary that allows him to read the contents of the public state database that contains the identification transcripts and user identity tags. Finally, an oracle OPEN is provided to the adversary that allows him to submit signatures and obtain the output of the opening algorithm.
We will say that a group signature is secure against misidentification attacks with concurrent join provided that for all A it holds that Prob[G A mis (1 ν ) = ] = 1 − negl(ν). Framing. In a framing attack the adversary plays the role of the system where the interface represents a handful of innocent users. A framing attack is meant to capture any adversarial behavior that allows the adversary to make the open algorithm point to an innocent user. We remark that this captures the notion of exculpability as well as any other adversarial behavior that frames an innocent user. In the concurrent setting, we allow the adversary to initiate many concurrent executions of the JOIN dialog playing the role of a malicious GM. The goal of the adversary now is to produce a signature that opens to one of the innocent users.
Naturally in modeling such an attack we cannot allow to the adversary to do all the bookkeeping for the user database himself (otherwise an OPEN operation would be without meaning). Every time the adversary successfully terminates a JOIN dialog with an innocent user that is controlled by the interface I, the interface will add the user identity into the St users and will append the whole communication transcript to St join−trans . Moreover it will keep a private database containing the secrets of the innocent users that will have the format i, sec i (these will not be accessible to the adversary). In addition to the above, we will allow the adversary to submit queries to a SIGN oracle that will be handled by the interface I and will accept the identity of one of the innocent users and a message and will return a signature of this message with the signing mechanism of the named user.
We allow the adversary to have appropriately restricted modify access to the public-state St; this access will be handled by I in the form of the MODIFY St oracle query. As mentioned already we will not give to the adversary full write capability to the public state St since if he is allowed to this, opening any signature correctly would be meaningless (e.g., if the adversary erases the database of JOIN transcripts it is straightforward that the opening capability is cancelled). The restrictions are as follows: MODIFY St will not permit the adversary to insert a join transcript that reuses an identity tag (this restriction is essential to maintain the semantics of the OPEN unambiguous) and will not allow the adversary to modify any of the identity tags or join transcripts of the innocent users (to these the adversary will have read-only access). Any other modification of the public-state will be allowed by I (in particular the adversary is allowed to introduce users to the public-state as well as erase them -for this reason there is no need for a "corrupt" oracle).
We will use the notation St I users to denote all innocent users in the system that are introduced by the execution of the concurrent JOIN oracle and are managed by the interface oracle I.
users ) then return else return ⊥; We say that a group signature satisfies security against framing attacks with concurrent join provided that for all A it holds that Prob[G A fra (1 ν ) = ] = 1 − negl(ν). Anonymity. Finally, anonymity is modeled as a sort of CCA2 attack against the identity encryption embedding mechanism of the group signature.
We note that the OPEN ¬ψ oracle operates as the OPEN oracle with the usual restriction that it should return ⊥ if the adversary submits ψ as the signature to be opened.
A group signature is said to be secure against anonymity attacks with concurrent join provided that for all A it holds that 2Prob[
Based on all the above we will say that a group signature with concurrent join is secure provided that it is secure against misidentification, framing and anonymity attacks.
Group Signatures with Efficient Concurrent Join : Construction
In this section we describe our efficient group signature construction. Our construction below is an optimized and more flexible variant of the scheme presented in the proceedings version of this work, [28] . A number of primitives proved to be instrumental in our construction including: Integer commitments [22] , BB signatures [8] and a CCA2 variant of Pailier encryption [31, 24, 16] . We first begin by describing the public-parameters our system will employ.
Public-parameters. The public parameters of the scheme are as follows:
p1 A (small) integer parameter v (1 ≤ v ≤ 5) and v pairs of groups of order p t where p t is a p -bit prime, p t > 2 p−1 , denoted by G 1,t = g 1,t and G 2,t = g 2,t , so that there is a mapping e t and a group G t and e t : G 1,t × G 2,t → G t is a bilinear map. Note that t ranges in {1, . . . , v}.
It is assumed that all p 1 , . . . , p v are distinct. These groups will be assumed to satisfy the Strong Diffie Hellman assumption.
p2 an RSA-modulus n, of n bits; n is selected so that Strong-RSA will be infeasible over QR(n).
p3 Four integer ranges S, S , S f , S f over the parameters , p , v, k, k ; note that is an integer parameter suitable for the selection of RSA moduli. Intuitively S will be a range of integers from which RSA moduli will be chosen and S f will be a range of integers from which the factors of such moduli will be chosen; the ranges S, S f will be extensions of these two ranges that will be used in the construction.
The integer ranger S is defined as S = df S(2 −1 , 2 v( p−1)−1 ); we recall that the notation S(a, b) = df {a − b, . . . , a + b} (we call this an integer sphere centered at a). Observe that if x, y ∈ S and x ≡ pt y for all t = 1, . . . , v then it holds that x = y; indeed, the given condition implies that x ≡ p 1 ...pv y (cf. Chinese remaindering). But since
, which is the length of the sphere S, it follows that x = y. Now for two parameters k, k ∈ Z we select the range S as follows:
Note that all ranges S, S , S f , S f are assumed subsets of {1, . . . , φ(n)}. Moreover note that S f = S(2 /2−1 , 2 /2−1 ) = {0, . . . , 2 /2 } contains all /2-bit numbers; as a result, any -bit RSA modulus that belongs to the range S and splits to two equal size factors of /2 bits will have its factors inside S f .
p4 a safe RSA-modulus N of N bits with N = P Q and P = 2P + 1, Q = 2Q + 1, so that in the group Z * N 2 it holds that the DCR assumption is hard, and the value
Note that with overwhelming probability G is the subgroup of quadratic residues modulo N 2 that are simultaneously N -th residues; note that # G = P Q . It will be assumed that Z N contains the range S.
SETUP. The procedure first generates the public-parameters p1 and p2 and p3 as described above. Then, it executes the following steps:
It selects v pairs of values γ t , δ t ← R Z p and sets w t = g γt 2,t and v t = g δt 2,t for t = 1, . . . , v; this is the setup for BB signatures, cf. [8] .
. These values will be used for integer commitments.
(Opening functionality) the public parameters N, G according to p4 are selected as well as
and a hash-key hk for a universal one-way hash function family UOHF. We remark that this step can be entirely separated from the GM's setup phase and executed by an opening authority. Nevertheless for convenience and simplification of the presentation we do not make further distinction in the present version of the paper.
The public-key Y is set to
and the secret key S is set to to γ t , δ t v t=1 || a 1 , a 2 , a 3 . Note that the factorization of n is not needed and thus it can be discarded.
JOIN. In the join protocol execution, the user will obtain a v-long chain of BB signatures on an RSA modulus that he selects. A user's membership certificate is the signature-chain together with the RSA modulus; a user's membership secret on the other hand is the factorization of the modulus. The join procedure between a prospective user and the GM is described in detail below:
• (User→GM) The user initiates the procedure and selects x ∈ S to be an -bit RSA modulus with x 1 , x 2 its two /2-bit long prime divisors, so that x ∈ S f and x 1 , x 2 ∈ S f . The User transmits x to the GM.
• (GM→User) The GM checks whether x ∈ S − {0, 1} and whether x is unique in the system (i.e., it was not submitted by another user in a previous or concurrent JOIN instantiation); if either check fails the GM terminates the JOIN protocol; otherwise (i) it reads the public-state St, selects i ∈ ID so that i ∈ St users and in such a manner that i is distinct from any other concurrent executions that he may be involved simultaneously and writes to its communication tape the values i, σ 1 , . . . σ v , r where r ← R Z p 1 ...pv and σ t = g
The relations defining the signature of knowledge. Note that the parameter t is running from 1, . . . v.
• The user verifies that e t (σ t , w t g x 2,t v r t ) = e t (g 1,t , g 2,t ) for t = 1, . . . , v and that i ∈ St users ; if a test fails the user fails the JOIN dialog. Otherwise, it terminates successfully by setting his membership certificate to cert = x, σ 1 , . . . , σ v , r v t=1 and his membership secret to sec = x 1 , x 2 .
Observe that the user does not prove that x was selected appropriately; Perhaps surprisingly, we show that this is still sufficient for security in the concurrent setting. Naturally if the user chooses x inappropriately two things may happen: (i) the user may not be able to issue group signatures, e.g., this may happen when x is a prime; this naturally is of no concern to the GM, (ii) the user selects x as an integer that is easy to factor; while this is of concern there is nothing that can be done about it: this case is conceptually the same as the case that the user just leaks its secret-key; while this possibility is annoying there is little that can be done to prevent this in any group signature scheme (and it is beyond the scope of the present paper at any rate).
SIGN. We present the signing algorithm. The user possesses the following: a membership certificate x, σ 1 , . . . , σ v , r and the corresponding membership secret x 1 , x 2 . The signing algorithm will be obtained by applying the Fiat-Shamir Heuristic on an appropriately designed proof of knowledge. First, the signer computes the following values:
Note that ||x|| = x if x ≤ N 2 /2 and ||x|| = N 2 − x otherwise. Also recall that S(a, b) = df {a − b, . . . , a + b}. Subsequently the signer will construct the signature "of knowledge" on the given message m by providing a proof of knowledge for the relations given in figure 2 that involve the fourteen witnesses θ z , θ x , θ xz , θ r , θ rz , θ x 1 , θ x 2 , θ y , θ y , θ y , θ xy , θ ry , θ yx 2 , θ d .
Given the coin tosses of the signer for the selection of T 1,1 , . . . , T 1,v , T 2 , T 3 , T 4 , C 0 , C 1 , the witnesses needed in figure 2 are selected as follows: θ z = z, θ x = x, θ xz = x · z, θ r = r, θ rz = r · z, θ x 1 = x 1 , θ x 2 = x 2 , θ y = y, θ y = y , θ y = y , θ xy = x · y , θ ry = r · y , θ yx 2 = y · x 2 , θ d = d. Now, given a message m, the signature will be constructed as follows:
Using these values the following are computed (where t runs 1, . . . , v): 
The output of the signing algorithm is the tuple: 
|| t=1,...,v e t (T 1,t , g 2,t ) sx−c2 e t (T 1,t , v t ) sr e t (g 1,t , g 2,t ) −sxz e t (g 1,t , v t ) −srz e t (g 1,t , w t ) −sz e t (g 1,t , g 2,t ) c e t (T 1,t , w t ) −c
OPEN. Given a signature as described above: first the signature is verified as well as the relation
; due to the properties enforced by the proof of knowledge (cf. figure 2 ) it holds that x = (m2 −1 mod N − 1)/N . Then, the OPEN algorithm searches St join−trans for transcripts of the form j, x j , σ j,1 , . . . , σ j,v , r j with x j = x; the identity j of the signer is thus recovered. If no such x j is found, OPEN returns ⊥.
Length of the signature. It is easy to verify based on the above description that the length of the signature (in bits) is approximately 11 · v · p + 9 · n + 6 · N + 12k + 11k + . We note that several optimizations can be applied potentially to decrease the above size Still at this present form, the protocol, is clearly within practical limits (cf. next paragraph as well). Parameter Selection. The parameters employed in the construction above are as follows: (i) v, the length of the BB signature chain, (ii) p : the size of the elliptic curve groups G 1,t that are employed in the BB signatures, (iii) n : an RSA modulus size that is used for commitments. (iv) : the RSA modulus size that is selected by users. (v) k and k : parameters affecting the soundness and zeroknowlege properties of the non-interactive proof of knowledge that is employed in the scheme. (vi)
N : an RSA modulus suitable for the Paillier-like encryption employed in the construction. A possible choice of the parameters will then be as follows: p = 236, n = 1024, = 1000, k = k = 80, N = 1024 and v = 5. With this selection, a chain of 5 BB signatures will be employed over elliptic curve groups of 201-bit prime order and each user will be selecting RSA moduli from S = S(2 999 , 2 999 ) (i.e., arbitrary 1000-bit RSA moduli) so that the two factors should belong to S f = S(2 499 , 2 499 ). Based on these parameters the total signature length is about 32 Kb. In fact one can choose much more efficient parameters if RSA moduli of some specific form are selected; for example, a much more tight parameter choice would be as follows: p = 195, n = 1024, = 1000, k = k = 50, N = 1024, v = 3. In this case, there will be only three BB signatures over elliptic curves of size 181 bits and users will select RSA moduli from S = S(2 999 , 2 481 ). Note that this will result to RSA moduli of the special form 2 999 ± t, something that according to [30] does not appear to give an advantage to known factoring methods (nevertheless such tighter parameter selections should be used with caution). In this setting the total signature size drops to 24 Kb.
We note that the the parameter selection of p in [28] (who used v = 1) was incorrect due to an oversight that resulted in weak keys. A possible parameter selection for v = 1 (that employs special RSA keys as above) is p = 483, n = 1024, = 1000, k = k = 50 and N = 1024; nevertheless, increasing v as suggested here, allows one to use smaller curves something that in turn allows for faster operations.
Proof of Security
The proof of security is described here, it relies on the random oracle model (we prove the group signature rather than the interactive identity escrow variant of the scheme).
Proposition 5.1
Suppose that one possesses the witnesses θ z , θ x , θ xz , θ r , θ rz , θ x 1 , θ x 2 , θ y , θ y , θ y , θ xy , θ ry , θ yx 2 , θ d for the relations of figure 2 regarding the values T 1,1 , . . . , T 1,v , T 2 , T 3 , T 4 , C 0 , C 1 , C 2 as well as it holds C 2 ≤ N 2 /2. Then the following hold true: (i) Each of the v pairs (T 1,t g −θz 1,t , θ r mod p t ) for t = 1, . . . , v is a BB signature on θ x under the public-key g 1,t , g 2,t , w t , v t , e t :
Proof. For notational simplicity set θ ξ = ξ for all possible ξ and we drop the subscripts t for t = 1, . . . , v. Let us consider now the relation that enforces the signature validity from figure 2. We have that
by employing the properties of the bilinear map. Then we have that if we call σ = T 1 g −z 1 it holds that e(σ, wg x 2 v r ) = e(g 1 , g 2 ), i.e., σ, ris a valid BB signature on x. Finally, observe that
and as a result the decryption will be either x or ⊥. Moreover observe that
) 2d . The ciphertext C 0 , C 1 , C 2 would be a valid ciphertext provided that C 2 = ||C 2 || as well as
Theorem 5.2 The signature of knowledge that specifies the SIGN algorithm satisfies: completeness, special soundness under the Strong-RSA assumption and statistical honest verifier zero-knowledge.
Proof.Consider two accepting conversations as folows: We will show how to recover the corresponding witnesses for the relation of figure 2. First observe that,
from which we obtain that T ) c−c * ; now given that (i) the order of T 3 divides λ(n), (ii) n is a safe RSA modulus, (iii) c, c * is a 2 k numbers where k is smaller than log 2 n , we have that T 2 3 = (g
) 2 which is easily seen to imply that
(otherwise we can turn the prover into a factorization algorithm). Using the above we set θ z = 
which implies that,
Using similar reasoning as in equation 2 we obtain that
We set θ y =
c−c * . Observe that based on the fact that s * x , s x ∈ ±{0, 1} µ +k+k +1 it will hold that with overwhelming probability, θ x ∈ S(2 , 2 µ +k+k ) = S. In a similar fashion it can be shown that θ x 2 ∈ S f .
Next we have that,
and conditioning on the steps we have executed so far, it holds that
Using again lemma 5.9 we obtain that c − c * divides s * xy − s xy and s * xz − s xz simultaneously and as a result,
We set θ xy = c−c * and based on the fact that T 3 is already specified, using eqations 3 and 4 we can obtain the following relation :
something that can be easily seen to imply that θ xy = θ x θ y and θ xz = θ x θ z .
We proceed now to the next relation,
proceeding in identical fashion as above we obtain that θ ry = θ r θ y and θ rz = θ r θ z .
We proceed now to the next relation; we have that:
We set the witnesses θ y = c−c * + 2 . Observe that due to the condition s x 1 , s * x 1 ∈ ±{0, 1} µ f +k+k +1 it follows that with overwhelming probability θ x 1 ∈ S f .
We proceed to the next relation:
conditioning on the already reconstructed values we have that the above is written as :
and using similar arguments as in equation 2
Using the fact that T 2 = ±g θy f θx 1 1
(as shown above) we can easily derive that it must be the case that θ yx 2 = θ y θ x 2 and θ x = θ x 1 θ x 2 .
Next we consider the v relations over the elliptic curves. Observe that all witnesses for these relations have been reconstructed already over the integers and there are no witnesses dependent on the parameter t = 1, . . . , v. For convenience and readability we drop the subscripts t and we have that
−c * which implies:
conditional on all the above witness reconstructions we have that:
This implies that
, r( mod p) would be a valid signature for the underlying BB-signature scheme.
Finally, we turn to the relations regarding the public-key encryption. First we have that
c−c * we can rewrite the above as:
c−c * Note that G generates the subgroup of squares within Z * N 2 that are simultaneously N -th residues. Moreover C 2 0 is of course a square inside Z * N 2 . Given that P, Q, P , Q > 2 k we have that c−c * cancels in the above equation and thus it holds that C 2 0 = G 2θ d mod N 2 . In a similar fashion we have that
From which we obtain that,
and using the already reconstructed witnesses we obtain that,
Similarly as before we obtain that C
Finally, we have that
given that we have that
from which we obtain that
It is easy to see that the ciphertext (C 0 , C 1 , C 2 ) with the above structure in conjunction to the relation C 2 ≤ N 2 /2 will decrypt to the value θ x . This completes the soundness proof.
Regarding the statistical honest verifier zero-knowledge consider the following simulator for any randomly selected T 1,1 , . . . , T 1,v , T 2 , T 3 , T 4 , C 0 , C 1 , C 2 from the respective groups and then form an accepting conversation as follows: 
and the values R 1 , . . . , R 10 will be defined as they are determined inside the HASH application in the verification algorithm of the group signature. Applying lemma 5.10 on the s-values above we obtain the fact that the simulator is statistically close to real conversations. Proof. -see figure 3 for an overview of the transformation performed in this proof. In this proof we will assume that v = 1; the case where v > 1 is identical (in this case, the adversary would break at least one of the underlying BB-signature instantiations).
Misidentification
Let A be a misidentification adversary as specified in the misidentification attack game that also has access to a random oracle H. We will reduce this adversary to an adaptive chosen message adversary for the BB digital signature.
Let us describe now an adversary B for the Boneh-Boyen digital signature. First the adversary is given the public-key of the signature which includes the description of the groups G 1 , G 2 , G T as well as the description of the bilinear map e : G 1 × G 2 → G T and the values g 1 , g 2 and w, v ∈ G 2 . The forger B using this information samples all remaining public parameters for the group signature including the parameters for the CCA2 encryption p4, i.e., the values N, G. B now forms the public-key of the group signature scheme:
note that B knows the secret-key of the GM in the group signature with the exception of the signing key for the BB signature, i.e., B does not know γ = log g 2 w and δ = log g 2 v.
Prior to beginning the simulation of A the B initializes a table H for the simulation of the random oracle that is employed by A. The public-state St is initialized as described in the attack game (empty). Now, B starts the simulation of the adversary A; B has the following queries to answer:
Random Oracle queries: these are simulated using the READ St : B returns the whole contents of the St strings.
JOIN ↔GM ; Start − Session queries: B receives the start session command from the adversary. As the GM does not goes first in the JOIN protocol, B simply selects a session id and returns is to the adversary.
JOIN ↔GM ; Advance − Session queries: B takes a message s, x from the adversary. Recall that the JOIN protocol has only two communication flows. B returns fail in the following cases: (i) s is not a valid session identifier, (ii) s is a valid session identifier but x is not an integer in the range S ; in this case the session s is marked by B as invalid and is terminated. Now if x is an integer in the range S , B submits x to his signing oracle for the BB signature, and obtains through it a signature (σ, r) such that e(σ, wg x 2 v r ) = e(g 1 , g 2 ). B returns to the adversary i, σ, r where i = max St users + 1 and updates St users and St join−trans accordingly.
OPEN: B knows the secret-keys for the encryption thus opening queries are also straightforward to answer.
Continuing as above the adversary terminates by producing a message m and a valid group signature m, σ where, σ is equal to
Assume now that the above passes the verification test and moreover it satisfies OPEN(m, σ, Y, S, St) = ⊥ (i.e., the adversary wins the misidentification attack game); note that OPEN employs only the encryption secret-key and as a result it can be applied by B. Now using rewinding and the forking lemma of Pointcheval and Stern [32] , we can obtain with non-negligible probability a σ * on the same message m, such that σ * is equal to
so that the above is also a valid signature of knowledge. Now based on theorem 5.2 we can reconstruct the witnesses (this is where the Strong-RSA assumption is needed) and based on proposition 5.1 we have that T 1,1 g −θz 1,1 , θ r is a valid BB signature on θ x . Now observe that OPEN(m, σ, Y, S, St) = ⊥; due to proposition 5.1, the ciphertext C 0 , C 1 , C 2 must be valid and decrypts to the value θ x ; since OPEN(m, σ, Y, S, St) = ⊥ this means that θ x is not among the x-values that were submitted by the adversary in the concurrent protocol JOIN dialogs with the interface. As a result B never queried the value θ x to its signing oracle. B terminates by returning θ x ; T 1,1 g −θz 1,1 , θ r as a forgery against the BB signature scheme. Note that due to the fact that the integer range S is selected appropriately (see the parameter selection p3) it cannot be the case that the adversary submitted some value n 0 to the signing oracle for which it holds θ x ≡ p 1 n 0 but θ x = n 0 as integers (with Chinese remaindering this carries to the case v > 1.
From the above it follows that B outputs a forged signature and thus it is an adaptive chosen message attacker against the BB signature. 
Framing Theorem 5.4 Any framing attacker in the random oracle model against our group signature can be transformed to a factoring algorithm in the standard model assuming the Strong-RSA assumption.
Proof. -consult figure 4 for an overview of the transformation.
Let A be a framing adversary as specified in the framing attack game that also has access to a random oracle H. We will transform this adversary to a factoring algorithm B (that will work for RSA moduli according to the specifications of the selection of x in step 1 of the JOIN dialog, i.e., x ∈ S −S f such that x 1 , x 2 ∈ S f ). Again without loss of generality we assume that v = 1.
We describe below how B operates given an integer n 0 ∈ S . B will sample the public-key Y and the secret-key S of the system exactly as it is specified in the SETUP algorithm.
Prior to beginning the simulation of A, B will initialize a table H for the simulation of the random oracle that is employed by A. The public-state St is initialized as described in the attack game (empty). Now, B starts the simulation of the adversary A; suppose that the adversary A makes q 0 JOIN dialog initiations. B selects j 0 ← R {1, . . . , q 0 }. Then, in the simulation of A, B has the following queries to answer: Random Oracle queries: these are simulated using the JOIN ↔U ser ; Start − Session queries: B receives the start session command from the adversary. Suppose this is the j-th time that the adversary issued a Start − Session query. As the user does go first in JOIN protocol, B selects x j an RSA modulus in S , unless it is the case that j = j 0 where B selects x j = n 0 (the challenge RSA modulus). B also selects a session id and returns the id and x j to the adversary.
JOIN ↔U ser ; Advance − Session queries: B takes a message s, msg from the adversary. Recall that the JOIN protocol has only two communication flows. B returns fail in the following cases: (i) s is not a valid session identifier, (ii) s is a valid session identifier but msg is not a tuple of the form i, σ, r with e(σ, wg g 2 ) or it holds that i ∈ St users ; in this case the session s is marked by B as invalid and is terminated. Otherwise B writes in the public-state St the user i, i.e., it modifies St users = St users || i and St join−trans = St join−trans || i, x j , σ, r .
Note that we do not require from the adversary to follow the same numbering of users that the GM performs during normal protocol executions.
Continuing as above the adversary terminates by producing a message m and a valid group signature m, σ where σ is equal to: that passes the verification test and moreover it satisfies OPEN(m, σ, Y, S, St) ∈ St I users ; note that OPEN employs only the public-key encryption secret-key and as a result it can be applied by B. Now using rewinding and the forking lemma of Pointcheval and Stern [32] , we can obtain with nonnegligible probability a signature σ * on the same message m, where σ * is equal to so that the above is also a valid signature of knowledge. Now based on theorem 5.2 we can reconstruct the witnesses (this is where the Strong-RSA assumption is needed); based on the properties of the reconstruction we have that θ x 1 , θ x 2 is a factorization of θ x so that θ x 1 , θ x 2 ∈ S f (this range constraint is enforced by the proof). Now recall that OPEN(m, σ, Y, S, St) ∈ St I users ; this means that θ x is among the x-values that were selected by B in the concurrent protocol JOIN dialogs and as a result with probability 1/q 0 it holds that θ x = n 0 . In this case, θ x 1 , θ x 2 is a non-trivial split of n 0 (due to the fact that n 0 ∈ S f ) and thus B terminates successfully by returning θ x 1 , θ x 2 .
Anonymity
Theorem 5.5 Any anonymity adversary against our group signature in the random oracle model can be transformed to a CCA2 attacker against the public-key encryption that is employed in our scheme; this is conditional on the validity of (i) the assumption that the digital signature scheme employed (BBsignature) satisfies strong existential unforgeability (which is true assuming the Strong Diffie Hellman Assumption). (ii) the DLOG assumption over the subgroup of 2N -th residues inside Z * N 2 .
Proof. -consult figure 5 for an overview of the transformation described in this proof. Let A be an anonymity adversary as specified in the anonymity attack game G A anon (1 ν ). Note that A has access to the random oracle H. We will transform A to a CCA2 adversary B against the CCA2 public-key encryption that is employed for the OPEN algorithm. Without loss of generality we assume that v = 1. Below we describe the operation of this algorithm B: Initially, B is given the public-key N, G, H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , desc(UOHF), hk for the encryption scheme. B will use these values to form the public-key of the group signature scheme. In particular, B will select
as in the SETUP protocol with the exception of the public-key of the encryption. Moreover, B will initialize St to empty and initializes tables for the random oracle simulation as usual.
The simulation of A will proceed as follows: The play phase of A will correspond to the plaintext selection of the CCA2 adversary B. B has to simulate the following oracle queries of A:
Random Oracle queries: these are simulated using the The simulation of the play terminates and B receives aux, m, cert 1 , sec 1 , cert 2 , sec 2 ; if B receives cert i , sec i that are not valid certificates and secrets it terminates with ⊥.
Observe the following now: the certificates returned by A are of the form: cert 1 = x 1 , σ 1 , r 1 and cert 2 = x 2 , σ 2 , r 2 . Moreover, it must be that x 1 = x 2 . We note that if it is the case x 1 = x 2 but cert 1 = cert 2 then this means that the adversary obtained two BB signatures on the same integer x 1 = x 2 . As the signing oracle would never provide such a signature (it keeps a record of what values, users have submitted before) it must be the case that the adversary came up with two different signatures on the same message. This violates the strong existential unforgeability (see [1] ) of the BB signature and thus it can be considered a negligible event.
The CCA2 adversary B terminates its guess stage by outputing aux = aux||cert 1 ||sec 1 ||cert 2 ||sec 2 and x 1 , x 2 as its choices for the two plaintexts for the CCA2 challenge. Now B, given the challenge ciphertext C 0 , C 1 , C 2 , must build the group signature ψ gs that will be the challenge for A and should incorporate C 0 , C 1 , C 2 . The SIGN operation at step 5 is simulated by B as follows:
Using these values and by programming the random oracle appropriately, B forms the group signature ψ gs .
It is easy to see that forming the challenge group signature ψ gs in this fashion it is indistinguishable from actual group signatures of the signer that is selected by the adversary (there will also be some negligible statistical distance due to the commitments T 2 , T 3 , T 4 and the honest verifier zero-knowledge simulation of the signature). The challenge signature on the message m would be as follows: With this setup B proceeds with the simulation of the guess stage of the adversary A. The operation proceeds in the same fashion as above with the usual restrictions: the OPEN oracle supplied to the adversary is restricted not to accept the same signature as the challenge signature. Suppose that the adversary supplies the following signature on a message m for opening: According to the restriction imposed to the adversary it holds that (m, ψ gs ) = (m , ψ ). Now, in the case that ψ is a valid signature, with a simulation soundness argument, the restriction that (m, ψ gs ) = (m , ψ ) implies that C 0 , C 1 , C 2 = C 0 , C 1 , C 2 with overwhelming probability. Indeed if A is capable of producing a pair (m , ψ ) so that ψ is a valid signature on m and ψ and ψ gs share the same identification ciphertext C 0 , C 1 , C 2 this means that we will be able to compute discretelogarithms over the subgroup of quadratic and N -th residues in Z * N 2 . Based on the above it holds that the signature ψ can be opened by B through his opening oracle. Finally, B terminates by returning the output of the adversary A. It is easy to verify that B is a CCA2 adversary for the employed public-key encryption.
The above three theorems culminate to the following theorem: so that χ ≡ n −1. Now if t is odd, we have that (−1) b 1 χ b 2 ≡ n ((−1) b 1 χ b 2 ) t and as a result we have z m = ((−1) b 1 χ b 2 y) t and we reduce to case (i) as well. Now suppose that t is even (something that forces m to be odd). But then, (y t ) 2 ≡ n (z m ) 2 would imply immediately that y t ≡ n z m since both y t , z m ∈ QR(n) and we are reduced again to case i. Case (iii). Suppose that gcd(δ, p q ) > 1. It follows that δ is a multiple of p (w.l.o.g.). Then we can factor n as follows: choose a random integer w less than n; if gcd(w, n) > 1 then we are done; otherwise, w ∈ Z * n and will happen that w is a square modulo p = 2p + 1 with high probability, (since approximately half of the positive integers less than n are squares modulo p). It follows that w p = (w 1 2 ) 2p = (w 1 2 ) p−1 ≡ p 1. Now compute the integer U = w δ = w πp (modn), where δ = πp for some π ∈ Z. Since n | U − w πp it follows that p | U − w πp and as a result, U ≡ p w πp ≡ p (w p ) π ≡ p 1. It follows that there exists an r ∈ Z such that U − 1 = rp. Observe that it has to be that r < q since U < n. From this we obtain that gcd(U − 1, n) = p. Proof. (of lemma 5.9) First observe we may assume without loss of generality that t is positive since we can always set y = y −1 as the output of A.
The sample space over which the probability α is taken is identified to the coin tosses of A and the random choices of B 1 , . . . , B m from QR(n).
Consider now the following experiment denoted by E. Let g be a fixed generator of QR(n). Select b i ← R [n 2 ], and simulate A on input g b 1 , . . . , g bm . From lemma 5.8 it follows that b i mod p q is statistically indistinguishable from the uniform Z p q and thus the elements B i = g b i for i = 1, . . . , m are uniformly selected from QR(n). It follows that y t = g e 1 b 1 +...+embm . The output of the experiment E is e 1 , . . . , e m , y, t. Let δ = gcd(e 1 b 1 + . . . + e m b m , t). The sample space for the event E corresponds to the choices for b 1 , . . . , b m as well as the coin tosses for the simulation of A.
We can split the sample space of E to the following events (i) E fail : the output of A fails to meet the specifications (either, t = 1, or m i=1 e i b i ≡ p q t). (ii) E div the output of A meets the specifications except that it holds that for all i = 1, . . . , n, t | e i . (iii) E δ<t all the specifications are met and δ < t. (iv) E δ=t all the specifications are met and δ = t. Based on the assumption of the lemma we have that Prob[E δ<t ] + Prob[E δ=t ] = α (for simplicity we omit the negligible statistical distance that exists between the executions of A and the experiment E).
Observe that if the event E δ<t happens the result of the theorem will follow directly from lemma 5.7 (by plugging the Strong-RSA challenge in the place of the generator g above and setting m = e 1 b 1 + . . . + e m b m ).
Next, let us consider the event E δ=t . The event E δ=t suggests t | e 1 b 1 + . . . + e m b m . Observe that we can view the event E δ=t as containing tuples of the form (π 1 , . . . , π m , ρ) where π j = b j p q and ρ is a sequence of coin tosses that fixes the randomness of A as well as the choice of b j (modp q ) for j = 1, . . . , m. Moreover, note that the output of A depends only on ρ and is independent of the choice of π 1 , . . . , π m . Consider the subset Ω of E δ=t for which it holds (π 1 , . . . , π m , ρ) ∈ Ω iff there exists j such that no tuple of the form (π 1 , . . . , π j−1 , π j ± 1, π j+1 , . . . , π m , ρ) belongs in E δ=t .
Next we show that if Prob[Ω] ≥ then Prob[E t=δ ] ≤ α− . Observe that the fact (π 1 , . . . , π m , ρ) ∈ Ω excludes at least one tuple of the form (π 1 , . . . , π j−1 , π j ±1, π j+1 , . . . π m , ρ) to belong in E δ=t . Nevertheless this tuple has the same ρ component to a tuple that belongs to E δ=t and thus it cannot belong to either E fail or E div . It follows that the tuple (π 1 , . . . , π j−1 , π j ± 1, π j+1 , . . . π m , ρ) belongs to E δ<t and thus if Prob[Ω] ≥ it holds that Prob[E δ<t ] ≥ and as a result Prob[E δ=t ] ≤ α − . Now suppose that the event E δ=t − Ω happens, we will show how to factor n. In this case we will obtain e 1 , . . . , e m and t such that t | e 1 b 1 + . . . + e m b m and ∃i : t | e i . Suppose without loss of generality that i = 1. We know that the outcome e 1 , . . . , e m , t of the execution of A corresponds to some tuple (π 1 , . . . , π m , ρ) of E δ=t − Ω and we obtain that t | e 1 (π 1 p q + b 1 mod p q ) + e 2 b 2 + . . . e m b m with t | e 1 . Due to the fact that (π 1 , . . . , π m , ρ) ∈ E δ=t − Ω it follows that some tuple of the form (π 1 ± 1, π 2 , . . . , π m , ρ) ∈ E δ=t . Because the behavior of A only depends on ρ it follows that for the same t, e 1 , . . . , e m it will hold t | e 1 ((π 1 ± 1)p q + b 1 mod p q ) + e 2 b 2 + . . . e m b m . By combining the above two divisibility relationships we obtain that t | e 1 p q , and since t | e 1 we have that t | p q . This implies that we can factor n as argued in the proof of lemma 5.7.
Suppose that Prob[E δ<t ] ≥ α/3. It follows that we can solve the Strong-RSA with probability α/3. On the other hand if Prob[E δ<t ] < α/3 we have that Prob[E δ=t ] ≥ 2α/3. Moreover, it follows that Prob[Ω] < α/3 and thus Prob[E δ=t − Ω] ≥ α/3. Since we can solve the Strong-RSA problem when either of the events E δ<t or E δ=t − Ω happen, it follows that we can solve the strong-RSA problem with probability at least α/3. Proof. We will denote by D a the distribution of the random variable s and by D b the distribution of s = t − c(x − L). Assume that the support of the two random variables is Z.
• Regarding D a observe that a certain s 0 in ±[0, 2 k+l m] has probability of being selected equal to (uniform probability distribution). Any s 0 ∈ ±[0, 2 k+l m] has probability 0.
• Regarding D b observe that a certain s 0 has the following probabilities of being selected: It is clear from the above that the absolute difference between the probability of a certain s 0 according to D b and D a is 0 for the integer ranges of cases 1 and 3 above. The distributions D a and D b will accumulate some statistical distance though due to their different behavior for s 0 that belong to the integer range specified in item 2. In this case, for a specific s 0 , distribution D a assigns probability either 0 or ). Clearly, in the worst case the absolute difference will be
The number of elements s 0 of case 2, are 2 · (2 k − 1)m thus it follows that the statistical distance of the distributions D a and D b cannot be greater than (2 k − 1)m/(2 k+l+1 m + 1) < 2 −l−1 . This completes the proof.
